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Abstract
This paper uses panel data from the 16 main states in India during the period 1967-
1999 to study the eﬀects of having higher female representation in the State Legislatures
on public goods, policy and expenditure. I find that women legislators make diﬀerent deci-
sions than men legislators. Moreover, women elected in seats reserved for scheduled castes
and tribes make diﬀerent decisions compared to women elected in general seats. Sched-
uled caste/tribe women favour capital investments, especially on low tiers of education and
irrigation. They also favour “women-friendly” laws, such as amendments to the Hindu
Succession Act that give women the same inheritance rights as men. In contrast, general
women legislators do not have any impact on “women-friendly” laws, oppose redistribu-
tive policies such as land reforms, favour pro-rich expenditure and invest in high tiers of
education.
JEL classification: D70, H19, H41, H50,O10.
Keywords: gender, caste, panel data, policy, India.
1 Introduction
In India, as in many other countries in the world, women are underrepresented in all political
positions, even if they form approximately one half of the population. While the proportion
of women who went to vote increased during the 1990s, women are still not well represented
in political life. In a representative democracy all sectors of the society should have a voice
in policy making. But, does women representation matter for policy determination? Do
parliaments where women have higher representation adopt diﬀerent policies?
This paper studies how women political representation influences expenditure, public goods
and policy decisions using panel data from the 16 main states in India during the period 1967-
1999.
∗I am indebted to Oriana Bandiera for her help and for very useful comments and suggestions. I am also
grateful to Tim Besley and Robin Burgess for very useful comments and the data provided. I also thank all
the EOPP seminar participants at the London School of Economics, at the ESPE 2004 conference and at the
EEA-ESEM annual conference 2004. All errors are mine.
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In political economy models where candidates can commit to specific policies and only
care about winning, political decisions only reflect the electorate’s preferences (Downs (1957)).
In this sense, women political representation should not have a diﬀerential impact on policy
decisions as the median voter equilibrium prevails. In fact, as long as women vote, their
preferences would be represented by the candidate elected, irrespective of this candidate’s
gender. However, if complete policy commitment is absent the identity of the legislator matters
for policy decisions (Besley and Coate (1997); Osborne and Slivinski (1996)). In particular,
increasing a group’s political representation will increase its influence in policy.
The issue of women political representation has been increasingly important in India. In
September 1996, the Indian Government introduced a Bill in Parliament, proposing the reser-
vation of one third of the seats for women in the Lok Sabha (Central Government) and the
State Assemblies. Since then, this proposal has been widely discussed in several parliamentary
sessions, without an agreement being reached. Those who are in favour of this reservation
argue that increasing women’s political representation will ensure a better representation of
their needs. Even those who oppose the reservation acknowledge the fact that women politi-
cians behave diﬀerently than men politicians. Clearly, reservation would change the nature
of political competition, by changing the set of candidates available for each seat, by altering
voters’ preferences or by changing the candidates’ quality. This paper explores the eﬀect of an
exogenous increase in women representation that took place without any institutional change,
and allows me to clearly identify the eﬀect of women legislators in the variables of interest.
I focus on state governments as these control most of the social and economic expenditure
and have the power to implement most of the development policies in India. Importantly, the
diﬀerent Indian states use the same budgetary classification, and have similar institutional and
electoral settings. Thus, using panel data from these states not only oﬀers the advantage
of data comparability, it also solves the unobserved heterogeneity problems present in cross-
country studies.1
In India some seats can only be contested by scheduled caste or scheduled tribe candi-
dates. These two population groups constitute the most disadvantaged sector of the Indian
society, both socially and economically. Since scheduled caste and scheduled tribe (henceforth,
SC/ST) women legislators might have diﬀerent preferences than women legislators who won
the elections for general seats, the impact of both general and SC/ST women legislators will be
identified separately2. Moreover, if the cost of running for election is higher for women than for
men, women legislators will probably belong to the elite. This will only be the case for general
women legislators, since scheduled tribes and scheduled castes are a more homogeneous group.
Thus, the fact that some seats are reserved for low castes allows me to identify separately the
eﬀect of low caste women legislators and to distinguish the gender eﬀects from the class eﬀects.
The identification strategy used in this paper takes advantage of the detailed data I have
collected on women candidates in India from 1967 until 2001. It is based on the fact that women
1These 16 states account for more than 95 per cent of the total population in India, about 804 million people.
They are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajashtan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
2Empirical evidence shows that almost no women SC/ST contested for a general seat and won the election,
thus, I can safely say that all female legislators contesting the elections for a general seat belong to higher castes
than female legislators contesting the election for a SC/ST seat.
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candidates who won in a close election against a man will be elected in similar constituencies
and under similar circumstances than men candidates who won in a close election against a
woman. The fact that a man or a woman candidate wins in a close election can be considered
to a high extent random, and thus, the gender of the legislator eﬀect can be correctly identified
by comparing “treated” constituencies where a woman was elected to its “counterfactuals”,
where a man was elected.
In order to have a complete picture of the eﬀect of women legislators, I have collected
detailed data on the Revenue and Capital budgets, to identify the expenditure priorities of
these legislators. I also use data on public goods and two types of laws, one that is targeted
towards the poor and another one which is targeted towards women.
I find that women legislators have a diﬀerential impact on public goods, policy and ex-
penditure decisions if we compare them to their male counterparts. Moreover, whether these
women legislators belong to a scheduled caste (SC) or scheduled tribe (ST) reserved seat also
has an impact. In particular, scheduled caste and scheduled tribe women legislators favour
capital investments, especially on irrigation and low tiers of education, and increase revenue
expenditure on water supply. They also favour “women-friendly” laws, such as amendments
to the Hindu Succession Act, designed to give women the same inheritance rights as men. On
the other hand, general women legislators do not have any impact on “women-friendly” laws,
oppose redistributive policies such as land reforms, favour pro-rich expenditure, invest in high
tiers of education and reduce social expenditure.
This paper contributes to a larger literature that analyses similar issues using US data.
Thomas (1991) shows how states with higher female representation in parliament introduce
and pass more priority bills dealing with issues of women, children and families than their
male counterparts or women in states with lower female representation. Thomas and Welch
(1991) find that women in state houses in 12 states in the US place more priority than men on
legislation concerning women, family issues and children. Case (1998), finds how the state’s
child support enforcement policies tightened as the number of women legislators in the state
grew. Besley and Case (2000) show that the fraction of women in state upper and lower
houses are highly significant predictors of state workers compensation policy. Besley and Case
(2002) find that women in the legislature apply pressure to increase family assistance, and to
strengthen child support laws . Rehavi (2003) finds that an increase in female representation
during the 1990’s leads to an increase in Public Welfare Expenditure. This paper complements
this literature by identifying the gender and class of the legislators separately and finding that
both matter for policy decisions.
The existing literature on India focuses on the eﬀect of diﬀerent reservation policies. Chat-
topadhay and Duflo (2004) show how the reservation of one third of the seats for women in
Panchayats (local rural self-government) of West Bengal and Rajasthan has a positive impact
on investment in infrastructures relevant to women’s needs. Pande (2003), analyses how the
reservation of seats for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in the State Assemblies increases
the volume of transfers that these groups receive. My paper studies the diﬀerent eﬀects of
variation in both scheduled caste/tribe and general women representation due to electoral
outcomes rather than reservation policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the institutional
background. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the econometric strategy. Section
3
5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional background
India is a bicameral parliamentary democracy. The lower house is called Lok Sabha, and
has 545 members. The upper house is called Rajya Sabha, and has 250 members. India is a
federal country, and the Constitution gives the states and union territories significant control
over their own government.
The Vidhan Sabhas (Legislative Assemblies) are directly elected bodies that carry out the
administration of the government in the 25 states of India. In some states there is a bicameral
organization of legislatures, with both an Upper and Lower House. However, it is the Lower
House (Legislative Assembly) the one that takes the final budget decisions. The Vidhan Sabhas,
or State Legislative Assemblies, have the freedom to decide the budget they will allocate to
development policies.
Because of the nature of Indian federalism, state governments are the appropriate unit of
analysis. In a process of decentralization, the states have replaced the central government in
the economic decision making. The idea is that these decisions should be taken by lower levels
of government, that are more directly responsible to its citizens.
In the event of elections, the states and union territories are divided into single-member
constituencies. The boundaries of assembly constituencies are drawn to make sure that there
are, as near as practicable, the same number of people in each constituency. The Assemblies
vary in size, according to population.
Electors can cast one vote each for a candidate the winner being the candidate who gets
the highest number of votes.
The democratic system in India is based on the principle of universal adult suﬀrage, and
any Indian citizen who is registered as a voter and is over 25 years of age is allowed to contest
elections to the Lok Sabha or State Legislative Assemblies. Candidates for the Vidhan Sabha
should be a resident of the same state as the constituency from which they wish to contest.
The 1950 Indian Constitution provides for political reservation for scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes. According to articles 330 and 332 of the constitution, prior to every national
and state election, a number of jurisdictions will be reserved for these groups. Both scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes tend to be socially and economically disadvantaged, and they
constitute about 25% of the total population in India. There are two criteria for the reservation
of jurisdictions: the population concentration of SC/ST groups in that constituency and the
dispersion of reserved jurisdictions within a particular state.
Women belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are those who suﬀer a major
degree of discrimination in India. Being a particularly disadvantaged within the Indian social
structure, they will have diﬀerent preferences than the other legislators in the State Assemblies.
On the other hand, political parties seem to propose more women candidates for SC/ST seats
than for general seats. Due to these reasons, and due to the fact that many general women
candidates belong to the elite, I estimate separately the eﬀects of these legislators on the
diﬀerent expenditure, public goods and policy measures under study.
In each one of the states, the budget is approved by the legislature after the enactment
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of the Appropriation Act which gives authority to the government to withdraw money from
the Consolidated Fund.3 Usually a budget speech is given to the legislature by the Finance
Minister of each state, two days after there is a general discussion in the legislature about the
budget proposal presented. This discussion lasts 6 days. After that, and during a maximum
period of 18 days, individual demands made by the individual legislators are voted in the
Legislative Assembly. Then, the introduction, consideration and passing of the Appropriation
Bill in the Legislative Assembly with the Governor’s consent lasts for about two days. In total,
the budget discussion takes a maximum of 26 days.
3 Data Description
I use data on the sixteen main states in India during the period 1967-1999. Tables A1-A4
report descriptive statistics of the variables used. My aim is to test the eﬀects of having higher
female representation in the State Legislatures on revenue and capital expenditure, public
goods and policy. I also test whether women legislators in scheduled caste or scheduled tribe
seats (SC/ST) have a diﬀerent impact than those in general seats.
The electoral data has been collected from the diﬀerent reports on the State Elections
published by the Election Commission of India.
As an indicator for female representation in general seats I use the fraction of the total
number of general seats in the State Legislature occupied by a woman legislator for each state
and election.
As an indicator of female legislators in SC/ST seats I use the fraction of the total number
of SC/ST seats occupied by a female legislator. The fraction of seats serves as an indicator of
the relative power of these state legislators.
The data on individual candidates for the state elections in India from 1967-2001 allows
me to calculate how many candidates were involved in a close election4 against a candidate of
the opposite sex for each state and year and for both SC/ST and general seats. I also use the
fraction of seats won by each political party.
All the electoral data used in this paper has been collected from the diﬀerent Statistical
Reports of the Election Commission of India. Figure (1) in the Appendix shows the variation
across election years and states for both SC/ST and general women representation. Women
representation has been low in all states during the time period under consideration, both for
SC/ST and general seats. In fact, at most 24% of the SC/ST seats and 14% of the general
seats have been won by a woman in an election between 1967-2001.
Despite the fact that women political representation is very low for all states in India, both
general and SC/ST women representatives are shown to have an eﬀect on both capital and
revenue expenditure, public goods and policy decisions. Due to the way decisions are taken in
the State Legislatures in India, even if female legislators do not constitute a “critical mass” in
3Defined by the Constitution as ”all revenues received by Government, all loans raised by Government by
issue of treasury bills, loans or ways and means advances and all money received by Government in repayment
of loans”.
4A close election is defined as one in which the winner won the runner up by a very small margin. In this
paper I define close elections as those in which the margin was less than 2.5%.
5
any voting procedure, they can still convince other legislators during or before the discussions,
and they can also introduce proposals that are then voted by the legislature. Mishra, R.C.
(2000), shows how evidence from the debates in the Orissa Legislative Assembly indicates that
women legislators introduce proposals in the legislature, participate in the debates and try
to convince their male counterparts of their ideas. This is true for both general and SC/ST
women legislators. Moreover, they could as well be the ”swing vote” when a given decision is
taking place.
3.1 Dependent Variables
I study the impact of female legislators on diﬀerent components of the state budget. For this
I have collected data on actual Revenue and Capital expenditure for each state and year.
Revenue expenditure is defined as expenditure on current consumption of goods and ser-
vices of the departments of Government, expenditure on Legislature, State Administration, tax
collection, debt servicing and interest payments and grants-in-aid to various institutions. Cap-
ital expenditure is defined as expenditure devoted to acquiring or creating assets of a material
and permanent character or to reduce recurrent liabilities.
Revenue expenditure in each one of the state’s budgets is divided among two main cat-
egories: Development expenditure and Non-Development expenditure. Development expen-
diture is money allocated to the maintenance of capital assets, both economic and social.
Non-Development expenditure is directed towards current and consumption expenditures of
the government.
Total Capital Disbursements are divided into two main categories: Total Capital Outlay
and Discharge of Internal Debt. Total Capital Outlay is mainly composed of Development
expenditure, which includes both Social and Economic Services. Discharge of Internal Debt
includes diﬀerent types of loans. Figure 2 in the appendix shows graphically how all the
diﬀerent expenditure categories are organized in both the capital and the revenue budgets in
all the Indian states.
I use the share of Total Revenue expenditure and the share of Total Capital Disbursements
devoted to each type of expenditure as an expenditure measure. Summary statistics for the
expenditure variables appear in Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix. Results in this paper are
for the 12 biggest subdivisions in each one of the budgets.
All the states in India use the same budgetary classification. The variables are deflated
using the Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers (CPIAL) and the Consumer Price
Index for Industrial Workers (CPIIW). The reference period used is October 1973-March 1974.
I also use some public goods measures. As educational measures I use the total number
of schools and the number of secondary, middle, and primary schools per every thousand
individuals. This will give an approximate idea of the supply of education. I also use the
number of teachers per thousand individuals. Data on kilometres of surfaced state roads per
km2 is used as a measure of infrastructure.
The policy variables I use are cumulative number of land reforms designed to tackle poverty
enacted by the diﬀerent states in India during 1967-1999. The types of land reforms used are
Tenancy Reforms, Abolition of Intermediaries reforms and Land Ceiling legislation.5
5 I use the land reform measure created by Besley and Burgess (2000). Details on this variable can be found
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The “women-friendly” policy variable I use is a dummy variable which equals one the year
a given state has made an amendment to the Hindu Succession law to ensure that both women
and men have the same inheritance rights.
3.2 Control variables
Control variables in the regressions include the proportion of seats won by each one of the
parties in each election, in order to distinguish the eﬀect of gender from the eﬀect of party
ideology6.
Other control variables include the real net state domestic product per capita, total grants
received by the central government in real per capita terms, population in each state, the share
of rural population over total population and a dummy for the year before the elections took
place.
All these variables could aﬀect the dependent variable in diﬀerent ways: the higher the
amount of grants received by the state, the higher will be their expenditure capacity, and this
can aﬀect their expenditure decisions. On the other hand, the population variables and real
per capita state net domestic product could also give an idea of the economic backwardness of
the state, which can also influence the policy decisions adopted.
The dummy variable for the year before the elections takes into account that legislators
might adopt diﬀerent policies just before elections, in order to increase their probability of
being re-elected. I also include a time trend in the regressions.
Since in 1985 there was a budgetary reclassification, I also include a dummy variable for
the years before 1985 in the expenditure regressions. This will be specially relevant for the
Economic expenditure in the Revenue Account, since this was the expenditure category which
changed the most after the reclassification took place. Another budget reclassification took
place in 1972, however, budget data for the period 1967-1972 can not be safely compared for
all the expenditure categories to budget data from later periods. For this reason I focus on the
time period 1972-1999 for the expenditure variables.
4 Econometric Specification
To analyse the eﬀects of having higher female representation in both SC/ST and general seats
in the State Assemblies in India on government expenditure, public goods and policy measures,
I use panel data for the 16 main states in India during the period 1972-1999.
The first empirical specification is:
there.
6There are eight main party groups: Congress, Hard Left, Soft Left, Janata, Hindu, Regional, Independent
candidates and other parties. Congress parties include Indian National Congree Urs, Indian National Congress
Socialist Parties and Indian National Congress. Hard Left parties include Communist Party of India and
Communist Party of India Marxist Parties. Soft Left parties include Praja Socialist Party and Socialist Party.
Janata parties include Janata, Lok Dal, and Janata Dal parties. Hindu parties include the Bharatiya Janata
Party. Regional parties include Telegu Desam, Asom Gana Parishad, Jammu & Kashmir National Congress,
Shiv Sena, Uktal Congress, Shiromani Alkali Dal and other state specific parties.
7
Yit = αi + βt + γWit + δXit + uit (1)
Where Yit is the measure of expenditure, public goods or policy for state i in year t. αi
and βtare state and year fixed eﬀects, Wit is the fraction of seats occupied by women in the
state assemblies elected in the previous elections, and Xit stands for other control variables
included in the regression which vary over state and over time and can also have an eﬀect on
the dependent variables of interest.
For the election years I use female representation as it was in the previous elections, under
the assumption that newly elected legislators might not have much power during the first
election year.7 Moreover, some of the elections are held at the end of the year, when decisions
have already taken place.
The year fixed eﬀects control for nationwide shocks or policies that were implemented in
all states at the same time. The state fixed eﬀects control for state specific characteristics that
do not vary over time.
Since women legislators who won the election for a general seat might have diﬀerent policy
preferences than women legislators who won the election for a SC/ST seat, I include both
general and SC/ST women representation variables in the regression. Moreover, in this way
I can provide more evidence on the diﬀerence between gender and class eﬀect. If the cost
of running for election is higher for women than for men politicians, women legislators will
be of comparatively higher classes than men legislators. Thus, the women representation
variable may only indicate class, not gender. India provides the opportunity of dividing the
women representation variable among general and SC/ST legislators. The latter, being a
socially and economically disadvantaged group will be more homogeneous, and thus, SC/ST
women legislators will be directly comparable to SC/ST men legislators. General legislators
are not such an homogeneous group, and thus, gender and class eﬀects could be confused
when comparing women and men politicians. Moreover, the comparison of SC/ST and general
women legislators is very interesting by itself, since it provides evidence that the identity of
the legislator is defined by both gender and caste. The equation I am then testing is:
Yit = αi + βt + λWgenit + θWscstit + δXit + uit (2)
Where, as before, αi and βt are the state and year fixed eﬀects and Xit are other controls.
Wgenit is the fraction of general seats won by women as elected in the previous elections and
Wscstit if the fraction of SC/ST seats won by women as elected in the previous elections.
Even though the state fixed eﬀects control for permanent diﬀerences across states in female
representation and the outcome variables, I can not rule out the existence of an omitted variable
that varies over states and over time and aﬀects both female representation and the outcome
variables. Thus, there might be some endogeneity concerns. In this case, the OLS estimates
reported in this econometric specification would be biased and specifications (1) and (2) would
7Results are robust to including the contemporaneous women representation variable in the election years.
Results are available from the author.
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not allow me to correctly identify the eﬀect of having higher women representation on the
dependent variables of interest.
To be clear, if women are elected in constituencies where there is a “preference for women
politicians”, this variable might also aﬀect the dependent variables in my regressions, thus,
biasing the results obtained.
As reported in Table A5 in the appendix, however, states where female representation is
above the median and states where female representation is below the median do not diﬀer
on variables that might be correlated with “preference for women politicians”. States above
and below the median are very similar in both male and female literacy rates, infant mortality
rates, income inequality, newspaper circulation per capita, the percentage of voters who are
women and voter turnout.
To identify the eﬀect of women legislators on the variables of interest I have collected data
on the votes’ share received by each one of the women candidates in state elections in India
during then period 1967-2001, together with the margins of votes obtained against the winner
or, in the case they won the elections, data on the runner-ups and the margin of votes obtained
against them .
I can then use the information on women candidates who barely won the elections against
a man. This should happen in constituencies where there is no clear “preference for women”
politicians. If we consider that the last few votes received by both candidates are random,
both the women and the men candidates could have won the elections and, thus, the fact that
the woman candidate won the seat instead of the man is random as well.
This identification strategy is based on the regression discontinuity approach, although it
is not directly used in this study.8 The fact that there have been close elections between a
woman and a man candidate generates “near-experimental” causal estimates of the eﬀect that
women political representation has on the policy variables.9
The second type of regressions I run are based on these assumptions. In fact, I take as a
separate explanatory variable the fraction of women who barely won the elections against a
man over the total number of seats, for total women representation and for both general and
SC/ST seats as follows:
Yit = αi + βt + γ1Wcloseit + γ2Wnocloseit + δXit + uit (3)
Yit = αi + βt + λ1Wgencloseit + λ2Wgennocloseit + θ1Wscstcloseit + θ2Wscstnocloseit + δXit + uit
(4)
These two specifications are very similar to (1) and (2), but the political representation
variables are partitioned as follows: Wcloseit is the fraction of total seats won by women who
8For this I should be able to relate each particular legislator to an expenditure measure number. Since in
India, State Assemblies are composed by many legislators who choose a single expenditure measure each year,
I had to rule out the discontinious regression and exploit the discontinuity in the OLS regression.
9Lee(2003) takes advantage of close elections to generate “near-experimental” causal estimates of the electoral
advantage to incumbency using the discontinuous regression approach.
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won in a close election against a man. Wnocloseit is the fraction of seats won by women
who did not win in a close election against a man.Wgencloseit is the fraction of general seats
won by women in a close election against a man. Wscstcloseit is the fraction of SC/ST seats
won by women who won in a close election against a man, while the analogous is true for
Wgennocloseit and Wscstnocloseit. The residual category will thus be men legislators who
did not win in a close election against a woman legislator.
The close elections women representation variables account for the “exogenous” women,
those who won the elections in constituencies where there is no clear “preference for women”
politicians. Thus, if these variables have significant coeﬃcients, this will mean that my results
are not driven by reverse causality, and that the identity of the legislator, in this case defined
by gender and caste, matters for policy decisions.
However, the no close election women representation variables account for women who
either won against a woman or against a man in an election that is not close. Thus, they
are women who were elected in constituencies where there might be a “preference for women
legislators”, and the coeﬃcients of these variables can be driven by reverse causality.
In other words, the omitted variable would be correlated with the fraction of seats won by
women in an election that is not close, but not with Wcloseit, Wscstcloseit and Wgencloseit,
allowing me to identify the eﬀect of these legislators. In this paper I define close elections as
elections in which the votes diﬀerence between the winner and the runner-up is less than 2,5%
of the total votes in that particular constituency.10
Since there might be the case that people who won their seats in a close election behave
diﬀerently than those who won by bigger margins, the coeﬃcients for women who won in a
close election against a man could be biased. In order to control for this I also include in the
regressions the fraction of men who won in a close election against a woman:
Yit = αi + βt + γ1Wcloseit + γ2Wnocloseit + µMcloseit + δXit + uit (5)
Yit = αi + βt + λ1Wgencloseit + λ2Wgennocloseit + θ1Wscstcloseit + θ2Wscstnocloseit +
+µ1Mgencloseit + µ2Mscstcloseit + δXit + uit (6)
Where now Mcloseit is the fraction of seats won by a man in a close election against a
woman as in the previous elections, Mgencloseit is the fraction of general seats won by a man
in a close election against a woman as elected in the previous elections andMscstcloseit is the
fraction of SC/ST seats won by a man in a close election against a woman as in the previous
elections.
Men who won in a close election are as well likely to behave diﬀerently than those who
won by a larger margin. By testing whether the coeﬃcients for men and women who won in
close elections are the same, I can separate the eﬀect of women legislators from the eﬀect of
legislators who won in close elections.
Constituencies where a woman won in a close election against a man are considered as
“treated”, while those in which the men won are the “counterfactual”, since the fact that
the woman did not win the seat is random. In other words, “treated” and “counterfactual”
10 I have also defined close elections as those in which the margin was less than 2% or 1,5% of total votes.
Results are mostly unchanged.
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constituencies will be similar in all the unobservables, they only diﬀer in the fact that by
chance either a man or a woman won the election. In specifications (5) and (6), the variables
corresponding to women and men who won in close elections account for the fraction of total
legislators which are “treated” and “counterfactual” respectively.11
There might be concerns that two diﬀerent constituencies in which a woman contested in a
close election against a man might not be comparable if in one of them there were many other
women candidates contesting for the same seat. That would be a case in which political parties
perceive that constituency as “women friendly” and tend to field women candidates on that
particular constituency. If the number of women candidates contesting for the same seat as the
two close candidates is significantly diﬀerent for constituencies in which a man won in a close
election against a woman and constituencies in which a woman won in a close election against
a man, these two types of constituencies might not be comparable. As it is shown in Table A6
in the appendix, the number of other women candidates contesting against women who won in
close elections against a man is not significantly diﬀerent than that for men who won in close
elections against a woman, and thus, this seems not to be a concern in this study. This is the
case because the bias would be the same for both treated or non-treated constituencies.
On the other hand, it might be possible that women (or men) candidates in a close election
are in this situation because one of them is the incumbent for that seat in that particular
constituency. If this is the case, the variables for women and men legislators who won in a
close election would not be directly comparable. Moreover, the policies applied by candidates
who were the incumbent and won the elections again might be diﬀerent than that of candidates
who occupy the seat for the first time. However, as it is shown in Table A6 in the appendix,
the percentage of winners in close elections who were the incumbent is statistically the same
for women and men legislators. In addition, the percentage of candidates in close elections
who were the incumbent is the same for women and men as well. Thus, incumbency in close
elections seems not to be important for this study.
There might as well be concerns that the party composition in seats won in a close election
between two candidates of diﬀerent gender may not be the same as the party composition
in the whole State Assemblies. That is, if some parties are more likely to contest and win
in close elections, then results might only indicate diﬀerences in party platforms of parties
contesting close elections rather than gender eﬀects. I have compared the variables indicating
the proportion of seats won by the diﬀerent parties in the State Assemblies and the proportion
of seats won by the diﬀerent parties in close elections for the states and years in which they
were close elections and the distribution of seats among parties is almost the same.12
I have also included the proportion of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe population in
each state as a control in the regressions. For this I had to restrict the observations to those
between 1972-1992, since I only have this population data until 1992. Results were unchanged.
The identification strategy used in this paper crucially relies on the random assignment
of the winner in a close election between a man and a woman candidate. I have tested this
assumption by regressing the probability of a woman winning in a close election on diﬀerent
11Rehavi (2003) uses the fraction of close elections between a woman and a man won by a woman as an
instrument.
12Results available from the author upon request.
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variables that could presumably aﬀect the outcome of a woman winning the election, like both
male and female literacy rates, real per capita net state domestic product, infant mortality
rates, newspaper circulation per capita, political competition, the fraction of votes obtained
by the Congress party, the fraction of Hindu and Muslim population and both rural and urban
headcount ratios. None of the above coeﬃcients were significant13.
5 Results
5.1 Capital Expenditure
Total Capital Disbursements can be divided into Total Capital Outlay and Discharge of Internal
Debt. In this study I will mainly focus in Total Capital Outlay, which is the part of capital
expenditure invested in the creation of capital goods. Discharge of Internal Debt includes both
loans repaid and advances given by the state governments, which makes it diﬃcult to compare
over states and over time, since it might be diﬀerent for each one of the states.
Columns 1-3 of Table 1 show results for the fraction that Total Capital Outlay represents
in Total Capital Disbursements. Column 1 shows the OLS results, which shows no eﬀect of
women representation on this variable. In Column 2 the women representation variable is
divided among those who won in a close election against a man and those who did not. In
Column 3, men who won in a close election against a woman are added. However, none of
these columns show significant results for women representation.
Columns 4-6 show the results for the share of total state expenditure devoted to Total
Capital Disbursements. Again, women representatives do not seem to have an eﬀect.
However, it is also interesting to study whether results remain the same when women
representatives are divided among those who won in a general seat and those who won the
election for a SC/ST reserved seat. Results are shown on Table 2. Columns 1-3 show how,
within Total Capital Disbursements, the fraction spent on capital goods investment is aﬀected
by SC/ST women representation. In particular, women representatives who won in a close
election against a man for a SC/ST seat have a positive eﬀect which remains significant for all
specifications. Moreover, as it is shown by the p-value corresponding to the diﬀerence in the
coeﬃcients test, the eﬀect is significantly diﬀerent than that of men who won in a close election
against a woman for a SC/ST seat. The coeﬃcient indicates that, by increasing SC/ST women
representation by one percentage point, the share of Total Capital Disbursements devoted to
investment in capital goods increases by 2.8 percentage points. On the other hand, columns
4-6 show how general women representatives have a positive eﬀect on the share of total state
expenditure devoted to Total Capital Disbursements. Moreover, once we include SC/ST and
general men who won in a close election against a woman, the coeﬃcients are significantly
diﬀerent.
Capital Outlay can be divided into Development and Non-Development expenditure. I use
these variables as a share of Total Capital Disbursements. Results are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
Even if women representatives are not shown to have any eﬀect on any of these two categories
in Table 3, results in Table 4 show how women representatives who won in a close election
13Results for these last two robustness checks are also available from the author.
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against a man for a SC/ST seat have a positive eﬀect on Development expenditure. Moreover,
their eﬀect is significantly diﬀerent than that of men who won in the same type of elections.
Development expenditure can be further divided into Social and Economic expenditure.
Results are shown in Tables 5 and 6. Results in Table 5 show how women representation
has a positive eﬀect on the fraction of Total Capital Disbursements devoted to Economic
expenditure. However, by dividing the women representation variable among SC/ST and
general representatives, in Table 6, they do not seem to aﬀect it. In contrast, SC/ST women
representatives have a positive eﬀect on Social expenditure, which is very diﬀerent than that of
SC/ST men representatives, while general women representatives have a negative eﬀect, very
diﬀerent as well from that of men representatives.
Tables 7 and 8 report results for the eight biggest categories within Capital Outlay. Columns
1-6 correspond to categories classified under Economic expenditure. These are Roads and
Bridges, Transport and Communication, Industry and Minerals, Energy, Irrigation and Agri-
culture. On the other hand, columns 7 and 8 report categories within Social expenditure:
Health and Water Supply and Sanitation. In these two tables only the last econometric speci-
fication used in the previous tables of this paper is reported.
Even if results in Table 7 only show a positive eﬀect of women representation on expenditure
in Irrigation, results in Table 8 oﬀer a diﬀerent picture. Only SC/ST women representatives
have a positive eﬀect on expenditure in Irrigation, which is very diﬀerent than men’s. In
fact, by increasing SC/ST women representation by one percentage point, the share of Capital
Outlay devoted to Irrigation increases by 1.7 percentage points.
In summary, SC/ST women representatives not only favour investment in capital goods,
within this category they also increase Development and Social expenditures. Moreover, given
that women in India, as in many developing countries, are those in charge of water transporta-
tion, and given that SC/ST women will be the ones more likely to transport water, they will
also want to invest on these infrastructures once in power. On the other hand, even if general
women representatives increase the fraction of total expenditure devoted to Total Capital Dis-
bursements, they do not have an eﬀect on the fraction of it that goes to Total Capital Outlay
and they decrease Social expenditure. This shows that women representatives may have an
eﬀect on increasing loans given and repaid by the state governments, but not on investment in
capital goods.
5.2 Revenue Expenditure
Revenue expenditure is devoted to the maintenance of capital goods. Within this type of
expenditure there is a broad classification: Development and Non-Development expenditures.
Results for these broad subcategories are presented in Tables 9 and 10.
Columns 1 and 4 show the OLS regressions, columns 2 and 5 report results when the women
representation variables are divided among those who won in a close election against a man and
those who did not. Columns 3 and 6 include men representatives who won in a close election
against a woman, to control for the fact that maybe candidates who won in close elections will
behave in a diﬀerent way.
Results in Table 9 show how women representatives have a positive eﬀect on the fraction
13
of Revenue expenditure devoted to Development. Even if the coeﬃcient for women legislators
is not significantly diﬀerent from that of men legislators, this might be the case because the
latter is not precisely estimated. On the other hand, results in Table 10 show how SC/ST
are those who drive the eﬀect, moreover this is very diﬀerent than that of SC/ST men who
won in a close election against a SC/ST woman. However, neither SC/ST nor general women
legislators have an impact on Non-Development expenditure.
Development Expenditure can be further split into Economic and Social expenditure. Re-
sults are shown in Tables 11 and 12. Women representatives have a positive eﬀect on Economic
and a negative eﬀect on Social expenditure. However, once the women representatives variable
is divided among SC/ST and general women legislators, general women legislators are those
who have a positive eﬀect on Economic expenditure, although not very diﬀerent from that
of men, and a negative eﬀect on Social expenditure. Even if for the latter the coeﬃcients
for general men and women legislators are not significantly diﬀerent, this might be the case
because the coeﬃcient for men is not precisely estimated.
Tables 13 and 14 report results for the 8 biggest categories within Revenue expenditure.
The first four of these belong to Social expenditure: Education, Health, Water Supply and
Sanitation and Social Security and Welfare. The next two: Agriculture and Transport and
Communications belong to Economic expenditure and Police and State Administration to
Non-Development expenditure.
Women representatives increase expenditure in Transport and Communications, while de-
creasing Social Security and Welfare and Police expenditure. Once the women representation
variable is divided among general and SC/ST legislators, SC/ST women legislators increase
expenditure in Water Supply and decrease expenditure in Social Security. On the other hand,
general women legislators also decrease expenditure in Social Security and Police and increase
expenditure in Transport and Communications.
Overall, results in the last two sections show how, when looking at the coeﬃcients for general
women legislators, these may indicate class (or income), more than gender diﬀerences. Even
though SC/ST women reduce Social Security and Welfare expenditure, this can be explained
by the fact that it goes to disadvantaged groups, but not to scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes. But, while SC/ST women increase Development expenditure and expenditure in Water
Supply and Irrigation, general women legislators tend to increase Economic while decreasing
Social expenditure. This might be an indicator of the class of this legislators if high class
legislators tend to care more about economic than social issues.
5.3 Public Goods and Education
Women representatives do not seem to have any eﬀect on Education and Transport and Com-
munications expenditures in the Capital Accounts14. However, the expenditure measures might
be too broad to capture some of the eﬀects. In this section I look at the eﬀect of women repre-
sentatives on some educational measures, like the number of teachers per thousand individuals
for each type of school, and some public goods, like the number of schools per capita and the
14Results for capital expenditure on education are available from the author upon request. They are not shown
in this study because they do not constitute one of the 12 bigger subcategories within Capital Expenditure.
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kilometres of surfaced roads over the total state area. These variables will be useful because,
given that, for example not all capital expenditure in education will be spent in schools’ con-
struction, these public goods measures will give a more detailed insight on how priorities are
set by the legislature.
Tables 15 and 16 show the results for the women representation variable and for the SC/ST
and general women representation variables respectively. In these tables only the last econo-
metric specification is shown, which is robust to all econometric concerns.
Women representatives increase the number of teachers per thousand individuals in Primary
Schools. Moreover, they increase the number of schools per capita, especially Middle and
Secondary Schools.
On the other hand, women representatives have a negative impact on the kilometres of
surfaced roads, which might be an indicator that this is not a relevant infrastructure for
women. Even if this coeﬃcient is not significantly diﬀerent than that of men, the latter is not
precisely estimated.
By looking separately at SC/ST and general women representatives, results are a little bit
diﬀerent. For example, it turns out that once the women representation variable is divided
among SC/ST and general legislators, they do not have any eﬀect on the number of teachers
per thousand individuals in any type of school.
On the other hand, SC/ST women representatives are those who increase the number
of schools per capita, especially the number of Middle schools per capita. However, general
women representatives increase the number of Secondary Schools per capita.
These results are very robust and suggest that SC/ST women legislators will favour invest-
ment on lower levels education. This can be explained by the fact that SC/ST people have
always had less access to education than the rest of the population in India and might not take
advantage of secondary education. This eﬀect is even stronger for SC/ST women. However
general women legislators, since they are usually part of the elite, will be more interested in
higher tiers of education.
As what refers to road construction, only SC/ST women legislators have a negative eﬀect,
which indicates that they might not favour investments in this type of infrastructure because
they might not take much advantage of it.
5.4 Policy variables
In this section I explore the eﬀects of having higher women representation in the State Assem-
blies in India in two types of policies, one which is directly targeted to women and another one
which targets the poor.
The diﬀerent states in India have had the power to amend diﬀerent national laws and to
implement diﬀerent types of land reforms during the time period under consideration.
The Hindu Succession Act (1956) deals with intestate succession among Hindus15. It
includes the concept of the Mitakshara Joint Family, under which on birth, the son acquires a
right and interest in the family property. According to this, a son, grandson and great grandson
15Hindus constitute approximately 80% of the population in India. However, this law applies to anyone who
is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion.
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constitute a class of coparcenaries, based on birth in the family. No female is a member of
the coparcenary. Under this system, joint family property devolves by survivorship within the
coparcenary.
During the time period under consideration, five states in India have recognized that a
daughter needs to be treated equally and become a coparcener in her own right in the same
way as the son.
The state of Kerala in 1975 abolished the right to claim any interest in any property
belonging to an ancestor during his or her lifetime. They abolished the Joint Hindu Family
system, solving the gender diﬀerentials in inheritance rights16.
The other four states, namely Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Karnataka
instead amended the Hindu Succession law by removing the gender discrimination in the Mi-
takshara Coparcenary system.17
I create a variable which is equal to one if the state has passed one of these amendments
in that particular year or in the past and zero otherwise.
Land reforms can be considered redistributive policies, aimed at improving the poor’s ac-
cess to land in developing countries. Besley and Burgess (2000) classify land reform acts into
four main categories according to the purpose they were designed for. The first category is
called Tenancy Reform, which regulates tenancy contracts and attempts to transfer ownership
to tenants. The second category of land reforms are attempts to abolish intermediaries. Inter-
mediaries worked under feudal lords and collected rents for the British. They were known for
extracting large rents from the tenants. The third category of land reforms implements ceilings
on land holdings. The fourth category of land reforms were designed to allow consolidation of
disparate land-holdings.
In this study I use a cumulative measure of the first three types of land reforms, the ones
primarily designed to tackle poverty. The variable is equal to the sum of the cumulative number
of land reform acts in each category passed in the state.
Results for these policies are reported in Tables 17 and 18. In these tables only the last
econometric specification is used.
Women representatives who won in a close election against a man have a negative eﬀect
on land reforms that is significantly diﬀerent than men’s. However, once SC/ST and general
women legislators are considered separately in the regressions, only general women legisla-
tors have a negative and significant eﬀect on land reforms. This is consistent with the fact
that general women legislators are part of the elite and will then oppose these reforms. It
is interesting to note that also general men legislators have a negative eﬀect, but that it is
much weaker. This also confirms the fact that maybe general women legislators will belong
to comparatively higher classes that general men legislators, since the cost of entering politics
is higher for women. On the other hand, SC/ST men legislators have a positive eﬀect on
these land reforms, even though SC/ST women legislators have no significant eﬀect. Given
16The Kerala Joint Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975.
17The Hindu Succession (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act 1986.
The Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act 1989.
The Hindu Succession (Maharashtra Amendment) Act 1994.
The Hindu Succession (Karnataka Amendment) Act 1994.
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that poor and socially disadvantaged women in underdeveloped countries do not have access
to land, but poor and socially disadvantaged men do, the results obtained for land reforms
reflect very clearly the identity of the legislator eﬀect.
Results for the Hindu Succession Law are reported in column 2 of these two tables. In these
case women representatives do not have any impact on these amendments. However, results in
Table 18 show how only SC/ST women legislators who won in a close election against a man
have a positive eﬀect on this policy variable. Moreover, general men legislators who won in
a close election against a woman have a negative eﬀect on these amendments. The fact that
no eﬀect is found for general women legislators might be due to their class position. In fact,
elite women will be less likely to favour women-friendly policies if they perceive themselves as
representing the higher classes instead of the women electors. On the other hand low caste
women, since reservation is already made for SC/ST people, will be more likely to perceive
themselves as representatives for women, apart from representatives for scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes.
6 Conclusions
This paper shows that women legislators have diﬀerent eﬀects on expenditure, public goods
and policy decisions than their male counterparts. Moreover, whether these women legislators
belong to scheduled castes/tribes or won the elections for general seats also matters for policy
determination.
Scheduled caste and scheduled tribe women legislators favour capital investments, especially
on irrigation and low levels of education, and increase revenue expenditure on water supply.
They also favour “women-friendly” laws, such as amendments to the Hindu Succession Act,
proposed to give women the same inheritance rights as men. On the other hand, general
women legislators do not have any impact on “women-friendly” laws, oppose redistributive
policies such as land reforms, favour pro-rich expenditure, invest in high tiers of education and
reduce social expenditure.
However, unlike results for SC/ST legislators, results for general women legislators are
somewhat diﬀerent than findings for the United States, where women politicians seem to care
about social and especially family issues. 18 By taking into account that general women
legislators belong to the elite, i.e., they have higher income and better jobs than the average in
the state and sometimes belong to a family of politicians (Mishra, R.C. (2000)), these results
seem to be explained by the class of these legislators. Moreover, the fact that general women
legislators favour investment in secondary schools is consistent with this hypothesis, since only
relatively rich women will be likely to attend secondary education.
On the other hand SC/ST women legislators increase capital expenditure in Development,
Social services and Irrigation, and also increase revenue expenditure on Water Supply. More-
over, they favour women-friendly laws. These results seem to indicate that SC/ST women
legislators identify themselves with women, especially the poor and disadvantaged ones when
18Papers in the US literature do not take into account the socio-economic position of women legislators.
However, US data may not provide the opportunity to do it.
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taking their decisions. The fact that both types of women legislators reduce Social Security
and Welfare Expenditure in the revenue account is surprising, since some part of this expen-
diture are transfers to women and children. However, the fact that SC/ST women legislators
have a negative impact on this expenditure is less surprising if we consider the fact that this
expenditure category does not include transfers to lower castes. Moreover, low caste women
legislators invest in lower tiers of education. Given the historical diﬃculties that low caste
women have had to access education, they will be more likely to benefit from this type of
education.
Given the diﬃculties faced by women trying to enter political life, the assumption that
general women legislators will belong to the elite is perfectly plausible. Moreover, some of
these women decided to work in politics because of their family background. If general women
legislators belong to a comparatively higher class than general men legislators, maybe results for
these legislators are such that they capture more the “class” than the gender eﬀect. However,
SC/ST women legislators will indeed be comparable to SC/ST men legislators, since this is a
more homogeneous group. In this case, the gender eﬀect can indeed be captured by results in
this paper.
In summary, even though reservation may have other eﬀects on policy which are out of the
scope of this paper, one of them would be to increase women representation. However, one has
to keep in mind that not only an increase in women representation is important. Since both
SC/ST and general women legislators have diﬀerent eﬀects on the policies adopted, the social
and economic position of these women legislators also needs to be taken into account.
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TABLE 1
1 2 3 4 5 6
Capital Outlay Capital Outlay Capital Outlay Capital Share Capital Share Capital Share
women 0.4178 0.1191
0.2999 0.1434
women close 1.0796 1.0479 1.1807 1.2148
1.6874 1.6552 0.7161 0.7556
women no close 0.3166 0.1405 0.0327 0.0685
0.3091 0.3205 0.1392 0.1401
men close -3.5270*** 0.6935*
1.2765 0.3713
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 380 380 380 376 376 376
Adjusted R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.76 0.76 0.77
women=men (pval) 0.03 0.56
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes 
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.   
The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 2
1 2 3 4 5 6
Capital Outlay Capital Outlay Capital Outlay Capital Share Capital Share Capital Share
women 0.1388 0.001
(SC/ST) 0.2794 0.0829
women 0.2811 0.1251
(GEN) 0.2333 0.1295
women close 2.8515** 2.7900*** -0.1618 -0.0931
(SC/ST) 1.093 1.02 0.3024 0.2961
women close -0.844 -1.0212 1.2440* 1.2998*
(GEN) 1.2674 1.2424 0.683 0.6779
women no close 0.0652 -0.0301 0.0049 0.03
(SC/ST) 0.2638 0.2727 0.0826 0.0808
women no close 0.3195 0.2085 0.0476 0.0613
(GEN) 0.248 0.2544 0.1303 0.1276
men close -0.9298 0.8394**
(SC/ST) 1.019 0.3666
men close -2.6666** -0.1437
(GEN) 1.2303 0.4164
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 380 380 380 376 376 376
Adjusted R-squared 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.76 0.76 0.77
women=men (SC/ST) 0.01 0.03
women=men (GEN) 0.32 0.05
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes 
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.   
The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 3
Capital Expenditure 1 2 3 4 5 6
Development Development Development Non-Develop. Non-Develop. Non-Develop. 
women 0.4203 -0.0012
0.286 0.0336
women close 0.3257 0.2927 -0.0188 -0.019
1.4715 1.3843 0.1342 0.1348
women no close 0.3712 0.1881 -0.0008 -0.0015
0.2858 0.3013 0.0318 0.0307
men close -3.6662*** -0.0129
1.2539 0.095
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 380 380 380 379 379 379
Adjusted R-squared 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.37 0.37 0.36
women=men (pval) 0.04 0.97
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes 
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.   
The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 4
Capital Expenditure 1 2 3 4 5 6
Development Development Development Non-Develop. Non-Develop. Non-Develop. 
women 0.108 0.0124
(SC/ST) 0.2729 0.0258
women 0.3133 -0.0081
(GEN) 0.2211 0.0265
women close 2.6403** 2.5873*** 0.1182 0.108
(SC/ST) 1.0391 0.9687 0.0927 0.0947
women close -1.3518 -1.5381 -0.1303 -0.1307
(GEN) 1.0974 0.9924 0.1063 0.1061
women no close 0.0403 -0.0592 0.0097 0.0089
(SC/ST) 0.2604 0.2697 0.0247 0.0253
women no close 0.3802* 0.2628 -0.0007 -0.0003
(GEN) 0.2196 0.227 0.0269 0.0257
men close -0.8728 -0.0928
(SC/ST) 1.0068 0.0592
men close -2.8966** 0.0772
(GEN) 1.1902 0.1073
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 380 380 380 379 379 379
Adjusted R-squared 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.37 0.37 0.37
women=men (SC/ST) 0.01 0.05
women=men (GEN) 0.36 0.17
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes 
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.   
The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 5
Development Exp. 1 2 3 4 5 6
(Capital) Social Social Social Economic Economic Economic
women -0.0384 0.9501**
0.1376 0.4038
women close -0.4696 -0.472 3.3112* 3.2923*
0.5641 0.5649 1.8385 1.875
women no close 0.0025 -0.0105 0.7054* 0.6006
0.1307 0.1347 0.3652 0.4094
men close -0.2598 -2.0995
0.3943 1.7275
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 380 380 380 380 380 380
Adjusted R-squared 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.42 0.42 0.42
women=men (pval) 0.71 0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes 
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.   
The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 6
Development Exp. 1 2 3 4 5 6
(Capital) Social Social Social Economic Economic Economic
women 0.0178 0.1661
(SC/ST) 0.0773 0.3069
women -0.0264 0.6820**
(GEN) 0.1146 0.3059
women close 0.9075*** 0.8533*** 1.5827 1.5749
(SC/ST) 0.2956 0.2885 1.3102 1.271
women close -0.9287* -0.9388* 1.8007 1.6902
(GEN) 0.527 0.5223 1.6066 1.7287
women no close -0.0043 -0.0129 0.1211 0.0636
(SC/ST) 0.0784 0.0833 0.3082 0.3499
women no close 0.0395 0.0363 0.5639** 0.4927
(GEN) 0.1117 0.1155 0.2797 0.2984
men close -0.5133** -0.3032
(SC/ST) 0.2205 1.1387
men close 0.2532 -1.9071
(GEN) 0.4065 1.7162
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 380 380 380 380 380 380
Adjusted R-squared 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.41 0.41 0.41
women=men (SC/ST) 0 0.27
women=men (GEN) 0.03 0.03
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes 
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.   
The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Capital Expenditure Economic Social
Roads Bridg. Transp. Comun. Ind. Minerals Energy Irrigation Agriculture Health Water Sup. S.
women close -0.0714 -0.1585 0.146 0.5438 2.3840* 0.6495 -0.4441 0.6816
0.3278 0.4023 0.2238 1.5173 1.4162 0.647 0.4602 0.5505
women no close 0.1583* 0.2827** -0.0007 0.5563* 0.8939* 0.1317 0.0074 0.0109
0.0808 0.1324 0.062 0.3199 0.4482 0.1532 0.0812 0.0888
men close 0.1611 0.068 0.0923 -1.3375 -0.6329 -0.9894** -0.1696 -0.596
0.3249 0.3859 0.1742 1.1269 1.3544 0.4784 0.2077 0.3806
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 375 380 376 192 228 378 379 189
Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.3 0.35 0.19 0.59 0.15 0.49 0.76
women=men 0.44 0.63 0.85 0.21 0.15 0.03 0.55 0.04
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes 
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.   
The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Capital Expenditure Economic Social
Roads Bridg. Transp. Comun. Ind. Minerals Energy Irrigation Agriculture Health Water Sup. S.
women close 0.0191 -0.1822 -0.0156 -0.6649 1.6964* 0.1253 0.11 0.3639
(SC/ST) 0.1636 0.2293 0.1198 0.8593 0.888 0.3905 0.1908 0.2385
women close -0.1952 -0.1012 0.1667 1.406 -0.1434 0.392 -0.3778 0.3846
(GEN) 0.347 0.4034 0.1982 1.3939 1.2379 0.6327 0.4174 0.4782
women no close 0.0001 0.0018 0.0248 0.0138 0.0605 0.011 -0.0187 0.0788
(SC/ST) 0.0651 0.0818 0.0338 0.2418 0.2505 0.115 0.0503 0.083
women no close 0.1298** 0.2159** -0.0327 0.4640* 0.8808** 0.1412 -0.0119 0.0226
(GEN) 0.0612 0.0978 0.05 0.2621 0.3838 0.1062 0.0638 0.0737
men close 0.0116 0.0271 -0.1944* -0.5354 -1.8149* -0.5789** 0.037 -0.2045
(SC/ST) 0.16 0.1987 0.1125 0.7491 0.9256 0.2535 0.1696 0.2221
men close 0.0997 -0.0166 0.2548 -0.7859 0.8498 -0.4281 -0.2351 -0.317
(GEN) 0.324 0.4 0.1615 1.0877 1.3258 0.4499 0.2038 0.3965
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 375 380 376 192 228 378 379 189
Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.29 0.35 0.18 0.61 0.14 0.49 0.76
women=men (SC/ST) 0.97 0.46 0.24 0.9 0.01 0.09 0.78 0.08
women=men (GEN) 0.34 0.85 0.75 0.17 0.43 0.28 0.72 0.27
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.   
The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 9
Revenue Expenditure 1 2 3 4 5 6
Development Development Development Non-Develop. Non-Develop. Non-Develop.
women 0.3426** -0.8019***
0.1373 0.1854
women close 1.2010* 1.2079* 0.6099 0.5788
0.6443 0.6313 0.7141 0.7287
women no close 0.2682* 0.2904** -0.9010*** -0.9428***
0.1359 0.1356 0.181 0.1819
men close 0.4442 -0.8748
0.4874 0.6241
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 392 392 392 388 388 388
Adjusted R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.55 0.55 0.56
women=men (pval) 0.32 0.12
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.   
The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 10
Revenue Expenditure 1 2 3 4 5 6
Development Development Development Non-Develop. Non-Develop. Non-Develop.
women 0.0132 -0.108
(SC/ST) 0.1076 0.1344
women 0.2602** -0.6384***
(GEN) 0.1085 0.1488
women close 0.9210** 0.8340** -0.1633 -0.0807
(SC/ST) 0.4137 0.4029 0.4112 0.4079
women close 0.5096 0.529 0.5516 0.481
(GEN) 0.5266 0.5105 0.61 0.6365
women no close -0.012 -0.013 -0.1048 -0.119
(SC/ST) 0.1068 0.1062 0.1361 0.1355
women no close 0.2371** 0.2526** -0.7071*** -0.7322***
(GEN) 0.1135 0.1174 0.1529 0.1601
men close -0.7648*** 0.5824**
(SC/ST) 0.2753 0.2829
men close 1.0313** -1.3238**
(GEN) 0.4795 0.6409
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 392 392 392 388 388 388
Adjusted R-squared 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.55 0.55 0.56
women=men (SC/ST) 0 0.12
women=men (GEN) 0.42 0.04
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes 
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.   
The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 11
Development expend. 1 2 3 4 5 6
(Revenue account) Economic Economic Economic Social Social Social
women 0.5315*** -0.167
0.1744 0.1582
women close 2.4027*** 2.4327*** -1.1507* -1.1643**
0.7748 0.7272 0.5995 0.5859
women no close 0.3859** 0.4293*** -0.0956 -0.1152
0.1491 0.1442 0.1471 0.1476
men close 0.9002** -0.4069
0.4095 0.3705
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390
Adjusted R-squared 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.6 0.61 0.61
women=men (pval) 0.07 0.23
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes 
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.   
The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 12
Development expend. 1 2 3 4 5 6
(Revenue account) Economic Economic Economic Social Social Social
women -0.1840* 0.2502***
(SC/ST) 0.0975 0.0895
women 0.4898*** -0.2264*
(GEN) 0.14 0.131
women close 0.4652 0.3757 0.3261 0.3364
(SC/ST) 0.5402 0.5414 0.3706 0.3688
women close 1.8317*** 1.8862*** -1.0841** -1.1040**
(GEN) 0.6404 0.5929 0.4586 0.4569
women no close -0.2027** -0.1940** 0.2478*** 0.2418**
(SC/ST) 0.0969 0.0964 0.0929 0.0944
women no close 0.4002*** 0.4218*** -0.1729 -0.1794
(GEN) 0.1148 0.1096 0.1215 0.1212
men close -0.6882** 0.0405
(SC/ST) 0.3399 0.2984
men close 1.2680*** -0.2604
(GEN) 0.423 0.3921
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390
Adjusted R-squared 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.62 0.62 0.62
women=men (SC/ST) 0.08 0.55
women=men (GEN) 0.37 0.12
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes 
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.   
The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 13
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Revenue Expenditure Social Economic Non-Dev
Education Health Water supply Soc. Sec. Welf Agriculture Transport Com. Police State Adm
women close -0.5089 -0.2036 0.1094 -0.9575*** 0.2673 0.4333* -0.4786*** -0.3928
0.3753 0.1577 0.1813 0.2417 0.4353 0.2606 0.1499 0.3012
women no close -0.0048 -0.0593* 0.0509 -0.0960* 0.3889*** 0.1309* -0.0346 -0.0986
0.068 0.033 0.0314 0.0517 0.0899 0.0728 0.0237 0.0603
men close -0.2752 -0.0117 0.0054 -0.0618 0.4975 -0.1224 0.2871 0.6199
0.2408 0.1182 0.0899 0.1709 0.3134 0.196 0.287 0.3744
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 390 390 225 371 371 371 368 386
Adjusted R-squared 0.74 0.81 0.6 0.52 0.63 0.81 0.71 0.55
women=men 0.63 0.26 0.58 0 0.67 0.05 0.05 0.05
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes 
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.   
The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Revenue Expenditure Social Economic Non-Dev
Education Health Water supply Soc. Sec. Welf Agriculture Transport Com. Police State Adm
women close -0.1231 0.0591 0.1193* -0.3044** 0.2762 -0.0308 -0.1151 -0.0558
(SC/ST) 0.1932 0.108 0.0672 0.1251 0.3081 0.1261 0.0785 0.1734
women close -0.3102 -0.2195 -0.0215 -0.6967*** -0.0845 0.4249* -0.3312** -0.3303
(GEN) 0.3404 0.1405 0.1581 0.219 0.4572 0.237 0.1344 0.2387
women no close 0.0572 0.0011 -0.006 0.0229 -0.069 -0.0194 -0.0091 -0.0613*
(SC/ST) 0.0545 0.0263 0.0184 0.0367 0.0557 0.0338 0.0183 0.0349
women no close -0.0137 -0.0571** 0.0425 -0.0658 0.3714*** 0.1177** -0.0401* -0.0724
(GEN) 0.057 0.0287 0.0255 0.0462 0.072 0.0571 0.0217 0.0491
men close -0.2277 -0.0202 -0.0213 0.1269 0.7623** -0.1796 0.0447 0.0298
(SC/ST) 0.1573 0.0864 0.0772 0.1297 0.3821 0.1316 0.0878 0.1611
men close -0.0289 -0.0118 0 -0.1144 -0.3869 0.0167 0.217 0.5221
(GEN) 0.2562 0.126 0.11 0.1879 0.3665 0.2015 0.2414 0.3458
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 390 390 225 371 371 371 368 386
Adjusted R-squared 0.74 0.81 0.6 0.52 0.64 0.81 0.71 0.54
women=men (SC/ST) 0.68 0.57 0.13 0.01 0.2 0.37 0.19 0.72
women=men (GEN) 0.54 0.18 0.9 0.03 0.5 0.15 0.09 0.06
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes 
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.   
The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 15
Public Goods 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Teacherspc Teacherspc Teacherspc Schools pc Schools pc Schools pc Schools pc Km surf roads
Primary Middle Secondary Total Primary Middle Secondary (over total)
women close 13.4600* 4.2053 -1.5744 4.7100* 1.0978 1.1083* 0.3751** -7.3709**
7.0421 4.4082 2.6892 2.4747 0.9693 0.5656 0.1751 2.973
women no close 0.8482 0.1989 1.8889** 1.7140** 0.5167** -0.0262 -0.0169 2.8469**
1.6162 1.2328 0.8658 0.6839 0.2105 0.1024 0.0436 1.082
men close -2.9885 -2.387 -7.8803*** -2.0671 0.1482 -0.3437 -0.2931** 1.1153
6.074 2.7972 1.6614 2.4397 0.7949 0.3142 0.1411 3.2756
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 268 268 268 268 316 316 268 203
Adjusted R-squared 0.71 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.94 0.9
women=men 0.1 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.4 0 0 0.11
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend is also included. The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients  
between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 16
Public Goods 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Teachers/sc Teachers/sc Teachers/sc Schools pc Schools pc Schools pc Schools pc Km surf roads
Primary Middle Secondary Total Primary Middle Secondary (over total)
women close 14.5497 6.5859 -2.6012 5.1073** 0.3583 1.0121** -0.043 -7.2214***
(SC/ST) 11.6761 4.0084 2.4667 2.3325 0.7719 0.4893 0.1318 2.3551
women close 1.1216 1.7986 -0.3411 1.6692 0.6046 0.4193 0.4335*** -3.6698
(GEN) 8.172 4.0013 2.3544 2.2587 0.8646 0.4812 0.1418 2.3953
women no close 0.0454 -1.7635*** 1.0217** 0.5708 0.1239 0.0206 0.0620** 1.7063***
(SC/ST) 1.004 0.6387 0.5098 0.4847 0.1683 0.0691 0.0296 0.5732
women no close 1.3144 0.7966 1.1897* 1.0384* 0.3434* -0.0504 -0.0464 0.7549
(GEN) 1.7082 1.0057 0.6575 0.573 0.1786 0.0898 0.0372 0.5144
men close -0.5189 -0.4306 -1.2081 -1.5545 -0.3363 -0.1454 0.2236** 1.2484
(SC/ST) 3.1303 2.5457 1.0642 1.2903 0.5445 0.2087 0.1087 0.9071
men close -5.0367 -4.7938* -5.6046*** -1.5268 0.448 -0.3527 -0.3878*** 4.2878
(GEN) 5.6487 2.4779 1.4303 2.4352 0.8125 0.3597 0.1311 2.9132
state effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
political controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 268 268 268 268 316 316 268 203
Adjusted R-squared 0.71 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.91
women=men (SC/ST) 0.27 0.16 0.64 0.01 0.46 0.03 0.14 0
women=men (GEN) 0.49 0.15 0.03 0.29 0.88 0.14 0 0.09
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes 
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend is also included. The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients  
between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 17
Laws 1 2
Land reform Hindu
Succession
women close -55.2383*** 4.5419
14.1678 4.1574
women no close -4.0744 1.7326
3.1827 1.052
men close 2.4746 -5.5914**
8.17 2.2095
state effects yes yes
year effects yes yes
economic controls yes yes
political controls yes yes
Observations 356 461
Adjusted R-squared 0.92 0.66
women=men 0 0.03
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend is also included. The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients  
between men and women close is reported.
TABLE 18
Laws 1 2
Land reform Hindu
Succession
women close -5.8887 9.4976***
(SC/ST) 10.1243 3.0797
women close -45.8248*** -1.673
(GEN) 10.8614 2.553
women no close -4.4080** 0.3385
(SC/ST) 2.1691 0.5335
women no close -0.9237 1.6349**
(GEN) 2.7136 0.812
men close 10.0988* -2.1982
(SC/ST) 5.1059 1.7095
men close -11.7342* -4.3767**
(GEN) 6.8077 2.0192
state effects yes yes
year effects yes yes
economic controls yes yes
political controls yes yes
Observations 356 461
Adjusted R-squared 0.92 0.69
women=men (SC/ST) 0.18 0
women=men (GEN) 0 0.34
Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. 
For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women  and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes 
against a  candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.  
Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend is also included. The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients  
between men and women close is reported.
Table A1
Descriptive statistics: 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pop. Growth 544 0.020038 0.006966 -0.01296 0.03102
Real NSDP pc 522 0.123431 0.051839 0.045215 0.309966
Grants 536 0.426942 0.694855 0.044561 6741605
Rural population 560 0.769835 0.080426 0.5614042 0.9252676
women SC/ST 542 0.041435 0.041896 0.0000 0.240741
women GEN 542 0.036653 0.027301 0.0000 0.142857
women close SC/ST 500 0.002547 0.007434 0.0000 0.044444
women close GEN 500 0.003448 0.005699 0.0000 0.02381
men close SC/ST 500 0.0033605 0.0091374 0.0000 0.0571429
men close GEN 500 0.0034694 0.0068288 0.0000 0.0454545
Congress (prop seats) 544 0.432947 0.259663 0.0000 0.928571
Hard Left (prop seats) 544 0.078792 0.148719 0.0000 0.673469
Regional (prop seats) 544 0.15039 0.240951 0.0000 0.786325
Hindu (prop seats) 544 0.079119 0.130234 0.0000 0.6875
Others (prop seats) 544 0.046261 0.083608 0.0000 0.555556
Janata (prop seats) 544 0.132581 0.203612 0.0000 0.836735
Soft Left (prop seats) 544 0.013527 0.036223 0.0000 0.27044
Table A2
REVENUE EXPENDITURE Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DEVELOPMENT 554 0.6556671 0.0698543 0.3628616 0.7980239
SOCIAL 472 0.3882371 0.0577207 0.1861978 0.6531044
Education 550 0.2140319 0.0432961 0.0854469 0.3773786
Health 550 0.0751791 0.0231543 0.0056658 0.1386906
Housing 448 0.00486 0.0039723 0.00000717 0.0247883
Labour and labour welfare 448 0.0069216 0.0059917 -0.0258231 0.0593069
Social Security Welfare 448 0.0291381 0.020329 0.0000 0.1489918
Welfare SC/ST 264 0.0212783 0.0172942 0.0000 0.0901957
Water supply and sanitation 264 0.0241165 0.0115391 0.0000 0.0594948
ECONOMIC 472 0.2750369 0.0721322 0.001213 0.5307896
General Economic Services 448 0.0160417 0.0201425 0.0003736 0.2661011
Agriculture 448 0.1031637 0.0557867 0.0017507 0.5665448
Industry and Minerals 447 0.0152988 0.0102186 0.0001165 0.0763455
Transport and Comunications 447 0.0405094 0.0318742 -0.0016266 0.1781
Water and Power Development 447 0.0994694 0.0678818 -0.3958211 0.368472
NON-DEVELOPMENT 550 0.3294583 0.083895 0.0083134 0.6292282
Organs of the state 466 0.01212 0.0184369 0.0028696 0.4010231
State Administration 546 0.1018509 0.0293427 0.0038017 0.2373397
Police 446 0.0570928 0.0195838 0.0045695 0.1854423
Public Works 447 0.0099368 0.0067125 -0.0127769 0.0477026
Table A3
CAPITAL  EXPENDITURE Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DEVELOPMENT 452 0.4529742 0.1590552 -0.4363941 0.8539258
SOCIAL 452 0.0692197 0.0569918 -0.015788 0.4936851
Education 451 0.0087283 0.0088229 0.0000 0.0476581
Housing 452 0.0089661 0.0079298 -0.020768 0.0552299
Health 451 0.0212459 0.0308545 -0.0586123 0.2350102
Welfare SC/ST 258 0.0071205 0.0088164 0.0000 0.0599218
Social Sec Welf 344 0.0025188 0.0046127 -0.0142326 0.0365664
Water supply and sanit. 257 0.031623 0.0447149 0.0000 0.2105254
ECONOMIC 452 0.3780405 0.1559253 -0.482707 1.209.355
Agriculture 449 0.031976 0.0619198 -0.8110804 0.2610976
Industry minerals 447 0.023948 0.0206381 -0.0215158 0.1636151
General Economic Serv. 450 0.0151584 0.0241942 -0.0457434 0.2668729
Transport Communications 452 0.0673348 0.038521 0.0002859 0.3054822
Energy 260 0.0553519 0.0995704 -0.4845973 0.4008722
Irrigation 312 0.1913632 0.1098467 0.0006948 0.6373932
Roads and Bridges 495 0.0595343 0.0398016 0.0000 0.2496927
NON-DEVELOPMENT 451 0.0135494 0.0137817 -0.0225995 0.1072975
LOANS (repayed/given) 452 0.5341795 0.1635959 0.1238153 1384129
Capital out share 448 0.1155003 0.0554509 -0.0407726 0.3775794
Total Disburs. share 448 0.2503434 0.0818953 0.0681453 0.5285614
Table A4
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Laws
Land reform 430 3.255814 2.616899 0.0000 12
Hindu Succession 616 0.1493506 0.3567234 0.0000 1
Public Goods/Education
Teachers pc Primary 326 1.964101 0.7057099 0.6955931 6.617233
Teachers pc Middle 326 1.357517 0.7529265 0.2884801 3.41846
Teachers pc Secondary 326 1.501463 0.7053546 0.5054514 3.402602
Total Schools pc 326 1.98609 0.6971945 0.7483083 3.571947
Primary Schools pc 377 0.7467779 0.3089837 0.221277 1.51994
Middle Schools pc 377 0.1927244 0.1126238 0.0428238 0.441846
Secondary Schools pc 326 0.0878352 0.03267 0.0352982 0.1658901
Km surf roads/area 257 0.2709579 0.258427 0.0519514 1.381849
Table A5 Fem. Rep. Below median Fem Rep. Above median
Variable Obs Mean [95% Conf.Interv] Obs Mean [95% Conf.Interv]
F. Literacy rate 220 26.57 24.58 28.56 166 26.01 23.76 28.27
M. Literacy rate 220 55.35 53.54 57.16 166 54.53 52.68 56.38
Infant mortality rate 97 93.81 87.57 100.06 115 94.02 88.33 99.71
Gini 241 29.44 28.91 29.96 189 29.55 29.04 30.05
Newspaper circ. Pc 264 0.06 0.05 0.07 232 0.06 0.05 0.07
women as % voters 224 0.58 0.56 0.59 228 0.58 0.56 0.6
turnout 279 0.63 0.62 0.64 281 0.63 0.61 0.64
Table A6
% winners close incumbent
mean sd Pval diff
women 0.040421 0.016029
men 0.035501 0.015941 0.8321
% close incumbent
mean sd Pval diff
women 0.055556 0.036034
men 0.069444 0.038341 0.8027
n women contesting against
mean sd Pval diff
women won close 0.285714 0.5603823
men won close 0.376147 0.6496294 0.2686
Figure 1
W
o
m
e
n
 
r
e
p
r
.
 
a
s
 
a
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
s
e
a
t
s
Women Political Representation
year elections
 sc/st  gen
Andhra Pradesh
0
.240741
Assam Bihar Gujarat
Haryana
0
.240741
Jammu&Kashmir Karnataka Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
0
.240741
Maharashtra Orissa Punjab
Rajasthan
1967 2001
0
.240741
Tamil Nadu
1967 2001
Uttar Pradesh
1967 2001
West Bengal
1967 2001
Figure 2
Education
Health
Labour welfare
Social Sec. Welf
Welfare SC/ST
Housing
Water Supply San.
Social
Gen. Economic Serv.
Agriculture
Industry Minerals
Transport Communications
Water Power Devel.
Economic
Development
Organs State
State Administration
Police
Public Works
Non-Development
Revenue Expenditure
Education
Housing
Health
Welfare SC/ST
Social Sec. Welf
Water Supply San.
Social
Agriculture
Industry Minerals
General Econ. Services
Transport Communications
Energy
Irrigation
Roads Bridges
Economic
Development Non-Development
Capital Outlay Loans repayed/given
Total Capital Disbursements
DATA APPENDIX
Electoral data Election Commission of India: Report on State Elections
(various issues)
Public Finance data Reserve Bank of India Bulletin (various issues)
Population Census of India
Educational data Ministry of Education
Roads Reserve Bank of India Report on Currency and Finance
(various issues)
Deflator Indian Labor Journal, Indian Labor Gazette, Indian
Labor Journal, Reserve Bank of India Report on Currency
and Finance.
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